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Don’t Let the Facts Get in the Way of the Truth: 
Revisiting How Buckhannon and Alyeska Pipeline 
Messed Up the American Rule 
LANDYN WM. ROOKARD* 
The Supreme Court in the 1796 case of Arcambel v. Wiseman1 set out the American 
Rule with this cryptic statement of dubious accuracy2: “The general practice of the 
United States is in oposition [sic] to it [fee shifting]; and even if that practice were 
not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is 
changed, or modified, by statute.”3 This was the extent of the Court’s reasoning, and 
it has supported the rule that each party pays its own attorney’s fees4 for over two 
hundred years. Most notably, Arcambel was cited to support the Court’s rejection of 
the “private attorney general” exception to the American Rule in Alyeska Pipeline 
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society in 1975.5 Alyeska Pipeline was in turn cited to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * Law Clerk to the Hon. Mark J. Dinsmore, U.S. Magistrate Judge. J.D., 2016, Indiana 
University Maurer School of Law. Deepest thanks to Professor Jayanth Krishnan for providing 
invaluable guidance throughout the development of this Comment. I owe additional thanks to 
Professor Alfred Aman, Mallori Smith, and Samantha von Ende for their early feedback. 
 1. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796) (per curiam). 
 2. See John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recov-
ery, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 9, 15; John F. Vargo, The American Rule on 
Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 
1576 (1993). 
 3. Arcambel, 3 U.S. at 306. 
 4. Any article dealing with the Rule must first “decide a matter of style and usage. 
Should we refer to ‘attorney fees,’ ‘attorneys fees,’ ‘attorney’s fees,’ or ‘attorneys’ fees?’” 
Stallworth v. Greater Cleveland Reg’l Transit Auth., 105 F.3d 252, 253 n.1 (6th Cir. 1997). 
As Judge Danny Boggs, writing for the Sixth Circuit, entertainingly observed, 
In federal statutes, rules and cases, we find these forms used interchangeably, 
nay, promiscuously. There is sometimes no consistency within even the same 
body of law. Compare, for example, FED.R.CIV.PROC. 16(f) (“attorney’s fees”) 
with FED.R.CIV.P. 54(d) (“attorneys’ fees”). Statutes providing for the award of 
payments to lawyers are similarly divided. Compare the statute at issue in this 
case, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (“attorney fees”) with 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the Civil 
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 (emphasis added). We acknowledge 
that even some published opinions of this court have been marked by un-
explained inconsistency. . . . [W]e are now advised by the Court's Reporter of 
Decisions that “[t]he Supreme Court Style Manual expressly advises opinion 
writers to use the phrase ‘attorney’s fees’ . . . .” 
Id. (emphasis in original) (italics in original) (citations omitted). The court then quoted at 
length from a legal dictionary, which advised, “The only form to avoid at all costs is attorneys 
fees, in which the first word is a genitive adjective with the apostrophe wrongly omitted.” Id. 
at 254 n.1 (emphasis in original) (quoting BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN 
LEGAL USAGE 91 (2d ed. 1995)). While Judge Boggs elected to use “attorney fees” to be con-
sistent with the statute which the court was interpreting, I will stay clear of the unconscionable 
“attorneys fees” and instead use “attorney’s fees” throughout to mirror modern statutory us-
age.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988(b), 2000e-5(k) (2012); 52 U.S.C. § 10310(e) (2012). 
 5. 421 U.S. 240, 246, 249–50 (1975). 
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support the Court’s rejection of the catalyst theory in “prevailing party” fee shifting 
statutes in Buckhannon in 2001.6 For the American Rule, what happened in 1796 set 
the tone for over two centuries of muddled precedent.7 
Betwixt 1796 and the present, the Supreme Court and lower courts have handed 
down myriad opinions embracing, emending, and rejecting various exceptions to the 
American Rule.8 The line to Buckhannon may be traced through four significant per-
mutations9: First, implicitly recognizing the Rule’s imperfections, American courts 
created exceptions to it as justice mandated.10 The fee-shifting statutes at issue in 
Buckhannon have their origins in three of these judicially created exceptions: the 
common fund exception, the substantial benefits exception, and the private attorney 
general exception.11 Second, the Supreme Court, relying upon an 1853 court-costs 
statute to curtail what it perceived as ad hoc decision making by the lower courts, 
asserted the primacy of the American Rule in Alyeska Pipeline.12 Third, Congress 
whirred into action, crafting statutory exceptions to the American Rule that often 
mirrored the exceptions created by courts before Alyeska Pipeline.13 These statutes 
frequently provide for fee shifting to the “prevailing party” in areas of law designed 
to promote private enforcement of public rights.14 The lower courts overwhelmingly 
interpreted this language to award fees to parties that served as “catalysts” for policy 
change.15 Finally, the Supreme Court again determined that the lower courts took 
improper liberties, instead interpreting “prevailing party” to require victory backed 
by “judicial imprimatur” in Buckhannon.16 
But amidst this unsettled jurisprudential stew have emerged two distinct lines of 
Supreme Court cases: The first resounds in equity and generally embraces exceptions 
to the American Rule.17 The second resounds in statutory interpretation and generally 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 602 (2001). 
 7. This Comment expresses no opinion on the wisdom of the American Rule or even on 
fee shifting in general, either by statute or judicial decision. The exclusive focus of this 
Comment is on the Supreme Court’s unsatisfactory jurisprudence in this area of the law. 
 8. See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil 
Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. 
REV. 1087, 1093–98 (2007); Leubsdorf, supra note 2; Vargo, supra note 2; infra Part I. 
 9. Cf. Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 8, at 1093–103 (articulating this basic trajectory 
while additionally addressing a line of cases that effected a “more subtle erosion of fee-shifting 
provisions . . . under the guise of promoting settlement”). This is, of course, an over-
simplification, but one that allows for a manageable juxtaposition of the American Rule’s eq-
uitable and statutory development. 
 10. See Leubsdorf, supra note 2, at 28–29; infra Part I. 
 11. See infra Part I. 
 12. See Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 
17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 652 (2013); Vargo, supra note 2, at 1578 n.90; infra Part II. 
 13. See Burbank, supra note 12, at 652. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 
532 U.S. 598, 601–02 (2001). 
 17. See infra Part I. 
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rejects exceptions to the Rule.18 But only the Supreme Court’s decisions at equity 
have produced the types of discussions befitting the kinds of transmogrifications ef-
fected upon the American Rule. These equitable decisions have produced functional 
and logical, if imperfect, exceptions to the conceptually rigid Rule.19  
By contrast, Alyeska Pipeline and Buckhannon, two seminal Supreme Court de-
cisions resounding in statutory interpretation, lack conscientiousness and transpar-
ency, primarily for two reasons. First, the two decisions are grounded in an implicit 
philosophy of substantive minimalism,20 which counsels that courts defer as much as 
possible to the political branches “on the premise that decisionmaking by the political 
branches is generally preferable to decisionmaking by the judiciary.”21 Substantive 
minimalism, advocated by Professor Cass Sunstein and others, maintains that politi-
cal decision making is “sig[n]ificantly more legitimate in a democratic sense than 
judicial decisionmaking” and that this superior legitimacy outweighs whatever ad-
vantages the judiciary might have in its ability to protect individual rights.22 Professor 
Christopher Peters has identified several theoretical problems with substantive min-
imalism, particularly as it pertains to deciding individual rights.23 Among these: sub-
stantive minimalism fails to appreciate that the courts are less prone to majoritarian 
control (and the subsequent possibility for disrespect for individual rights) than the 
political branches; overlooks the value of adjudication, which provides a better op-
portunity for the parties to participate meaningfully in the decision-making process 
than the political branches; and ignores the benefits of the courts’ gradualist decision 
making and capacity for error correction.24 
In Buckhannon and Alyeska Pipeline, the theoretical problems with substantive 
minimalism come to fruition. Instead of fully contemplating and acknowledging the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. See infra Parts II, IV. 
 19. See infra Part I; cf. infra Part III (describing application of statutory exception as sim-
ilar to powers at equity). 
 20. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to make a broad assessment of the relative 
merits of substantive minimalism and more extensive judicial review. Instead, I contend that, 
at least in the context of the Court’s American Rule jurisprudence, the philosophy has done a 
disservice to Congress, litigants, and the Court’s own precedent. 
 21. Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1454, 1476 (2000). 
 22. Id.; see, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT (1999); cf. Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 
112 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1998) (articulating a deferential theory of jurisprudence wherein the 
Supreme Court “treat[s] more of its precedents as provisional than is formally permitted under 
the doctrine of stare decisis” to allow “social and political actors other than the Court to take 
leading roles in addressing novel situations”). 
 23. Peters, supra note 21. 
 24. Id. at 1494–1513; cf. Samantha von Ende, Note, SEQUELA: Casey, Gonzales, and 
State Legislatures’ Unscrupulous Use of Science in Crafting Legislation To Regulate Preg-
nant Women and Women's Access to Reproductive Health, 4 IND. J.L. & SOC. EQUALITY 21 
(2016) (observing, in the context of women’s health regulations, that “legislatures have relied 
on junk science and debunked theories in order to propose and pass hundreds of morality-
based laws” and noting the superior adjudicative fact-finding ability of trial courts). 
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consequences of their rule, the narrow majorities25 latched upon an interpretation of 
statutory language that they deemed absolute and indisputable.26 These statutory 
readings are detached entirely from the equitable moorings of the exceptions to the 
American Rule, give unnecessarily short shrift to the ability of district courts to do 
their jobs, and effect absurd results in light of clear congressional goals and ambig-
uous language—all in the name of deference to Congress.27 
Second, the Supreme Court has painted its substantively minimalistic art pieces 
with a broad procedural brush to unnecessarily bind parties with distinct factual and 
legal issues. This lack of procedural minimalism, which I refer to as “procedural 
maximalism” as a shorthand,28 diminishes the representative legitimacy of the 
Court’s holdings and disguises the superficiality of its reasoning, which may not 
withstand scrutiny in a distinguishable case.29 The quality of the reasoning—not the 
breadth of the label—should justify another court applying a holding from one case 
to another similar (though nonidentical) case when it comes before the court.30 
Alyeska Pipeline, in which the Court put a stop to the doctrinal development of eq-
uitable exceptions to the American Rule in the name of statutory interpretation, is a 
more traditional example of this lack of restraint.31 Without explaining why it chose 
to do so, the Court rejected several, moderate approaches that could have preserved 
doctrinal development while reaching the Court’s desired result.32 
The Buckhannon Court rejected procedural minimalism in a different fashion: by 
making empirical assumptions about the policy implications of its holding.33 The 
Court assumed that rejecting the catalyst doctrine in favor of its judicial-imprimatur 
rule would provide efficiency benefits without exacting substantial costs of justice.34 
As illustrated by Professors Albiston and Nielsen, these empirical assumptions have 
proven to be false.35 Even worse, however, these empirical assumptions have gained 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. Alyeska Pipeline was a five-to-two decision, albeit one in which the most liberal jus-
tice on the Court, Justice Douglas, did not participate. IIT Chi.-Kent Coll. of Law, Alyeska 
Pipeline Service Company v. Wilderness Society, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1974 
/73-1977 [https://perma.cc/68XR-824N] (sort justices “by ideology”). Buckhannon was a five-
to-four split. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 
532 U.S. 598 (2001). 
 26. See infra Parts II, IV. 
 27. Compare infra Parts II, IV, with infra Parts I, III. 
 28. I do this recognizing, of course, that almost any ruling could always be broader. 
 29. Peters, supra note 21, at 1515 (“[A] lack of procedural minimalism, in the form of the 
articulation of broad judicial rules, threatens the legitimacy of interest representation in adju-
dication. Interest representation only works when the interests of subsequent litigants and con-
forming nonlitigants are coextensive with those of the participating litigants in material ways. 
But this is unlikely to be the case when a court announces a broad rule . . . .”). 
 30. Id. at 1516 (“The deep reasoning underlying the decision, precisely because it is deep 
reasoning, will have applications in other [similar] cases. In effect, the reasoning will operate 
as a sort of rule, influencing the decisions of future cases to which that reasoning is relevant.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
 31. See infra Part II.B. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See infra Part IV.B–C. 
 34. See infra Part IV.B. 
 35. Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 8. 
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traction as “factual precedents,”36 binding lower courts and preventing them from 
considering evidence to the contrary.37 That is, courts of appeals applying 
Buckhannon have refused to countenance evidence to the contrary of the Supreme 
Court’s assumptions, even as they have extended the case’s holding beyond its clear, 
black-letter law.38 The Supreme Court has resolved the distinct cases of nonparties 
by making sweeping factual assumptions, a method that surely comports with no 
conscionable jurisprudence. The situation demands that the academy and bench se-
riously address appellate fact-finding practices and the precedential weight assigned 
to appellate-found facts. 
Ultimately, procedural rules reflect policy decisions that directly impact the real 
rights of litigants, for example, by altering the costs, risk exposure, or likelihood of 
success in litigation.39 “[O]ne purpose can rarely be advanced without some other 
purpose being set back, or reduced in significance. That means that there must be a 
tradeoff, hopefully consciously and openly made . . . .”40 The American Rule, replete 
with exceptions and nuances, has developed in a manner that is anything but “con-
sciously and openly made,” especially compared to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which make up the bulk of American civil procedure law.41 The Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of attorney’s fees statutes frustrates Congress’s and the Court’s 
own intended benefits. If nothing else, litigants of all ilk deserve an American Rule 
that is the product of consistent, reasoned decision making that takes into account its 
effect on the myriad interests implicated by fee shifting and public-interest litigation. 
I. EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL EXCEPTION 
Alyeska Pipeline and Buckhannon take aim at the private attorney general doctrine 
in two forms: as a judicially created exception in the former and as a statutory ana-
logue in the latter. The judicially created private attorney general exception described 
in Section C evolved from two closely related, carefully cabined exceptions: the com-
mon fund exception addressed in Section A and the substantial benefit extension ad-
dressed in Section B.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 36. Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 76 (2013) [hereinafter 
Larsen, Factual Precedents]; see Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Find-
ing, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255, 1274 (2012) [hereinafter Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact 
Finding] (discussing proliferation of Supreme Court–found facts). 
 37. See infra Part IV.C. 
 38. See infra Part IV.C. 
 39. Alan B. Morrison, The Necessity of Tradeoffs in a Properly Functioning Civil Proce-
dure System, 90 OR. L. REV. 993 (2012). 
 40. Id. at 995. 
 41. Compare id. at 997 (“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . are issued by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, with most of the work done by committees of judges, practicing lawyers, 
and law professors as part of a very public and open process.” (italics in original)), and Will 
Rhee, Evidence-Based Federal Civil Rulemaking: A New Contemporaneous Case Coding 
Rule, 33 PACE L. REV. 60, 69–70 (2013) (noting how the key framers of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure publicly emphasize empiricism and transparency), with Leubsdorf, supra note 
2, at 28 (“[O]ne of the most curious features of the American rule in the nineteenth century 
was its almost total absence of justification.”). 
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Each exception stems from the courts’ “inherent equitable powers” instead of rule 
or statute.42 Further, each exception represents a balanced assessment of the impact 
of the new rule upon litigants and a workable, if imperfect, alteration to an otherwise 
rigid American Rule. For the most part, the courts recognized that their holdings 
would impact parties’ legitimate expectations during litigation and sought to mini-
mize undesirable collateral consequences by carefully tailoring their rules. That the 
exceptions were grounded in “equity” provides a fine starting place to begin to un-
derstand why these exceptions succeed in, at a minimum, conscientiously re-
calibrating the tradeoffs between different types of litigants43: 
[E]quity is defined by its commitment to “basic fairness.” As a result of 
this fundamental commitment, the Supreme Court has been repeatedly 
forced in its equity cases to confront and balance, as a matter of institu-
tional policy, the competing claims of formal and substantive fairness. 
Thus, the Court’s equity decisions constitute an ongoing two hundred 
year-old debate over the scope and limits of substantive justice within 
the context of a legal system committed to procedural formality and stare 
decisis.44 
A. Common Fund Exception 
As the name suggests, the common fund doctrine initially allowed for fee recov-
ery in actions benefiting an existing fund.45 In this situation, it is not the opposing 
party per se that pays the successful litigant’s lawyers, but the “class of which the 
successful litigant is a member, which would have had to pay these expenses had it 
brought the action itself.”46 
The Supreme Court’s seminal case recognizing the common fund doctrine, 
Trustees v. Greenough,47 involved a suit in equity by one Francis Vose, a bondholder 
in the Florida Railroad Company, on behalf of all bondholders against the trustees of 
the Internal Improvement Fund of Florida and the board itself.48 Vose’s action 
stopped and reversed several fraudulent conveyances from the Fund and cleared out 
the corrupt managers.49 In so doing, Vose saved a tremendous amount of money for 
his fellow bondholders—none of whom had to bear the expense of litigation.50  
                                                                                                                 
 
 42. Vargo, supra note 2, at 1584; see, e.g., Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 
167 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.) (“But when such a fund is for all practical purposes created for 
the benefit of others, the formalities of the litigation . . . hardly touch the power of equity in 
doing justice as between a party and the beneficiaries of his litigation.”). 
 43. See Morrison, supra note 39, at 996 (“[T]radeoffs . . . are not fixed, but [are] re-
calibrated as circumstances change.”). 
 44. John R. Kroger, Supreme Court Equity, 1789–1835, and the History of American 
Judging, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 1425, 1427 (1998) (footnotes omitted). 
 45. Vargo, supra note 2, at 1579–80. 
 46. George D. Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder’s Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. 
L. REV. 784, 786 (1939). 
 47. 105 U.S. 527 (1881). 
 48. Id. at 527–28. 
 49. Id. at 529. 
 50. Id. 
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The Supreme Court affirmed an award of attorney’s fees from the Fund (save for 
one particular item to which we will return) and did so with a rich analysis of the 
equities at play.51 The Court noted two particular benefits. First, the Court observed 
that a contrary rule would result in unjust enrichment for the nonparty bondholders.52 
Vose prosecuted his case with “vigor” and “at much expense;”53 the other bond-
holders should not waltz away with the “unfair advantage” of disproportionate pecu-
niary gain.54 Second, the Supreme Court believed that common fund doctrine pro-
vided a solution to a collective action problem: some actions that would ultimately 
be beneficial for a group would be cost prohibitive for an individual to bring if the 
initiator had to bear all expenses.55 This was the type of suit to be encouraged 
—though “the complainant [was] not a trustee, he has at least acted the part . . . in 
relation to the common interest.”56 As one district judge later observed, the prospect 
of fees encourages attorneys to bring valuable actions, akin to a maritime salvage 
award to encourage salvors to dig up ships found amongst the ocean blue.57 
On the other side of the ledger, the Court first dispatched with any concerns that 
shifting fees would be unfair to the trustees. While the trustees who were the subject 
of the instant suit may have done no wrong, the acts of their predecessors “furnished 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. See id. at 531–38. Justice Miller, the lone dissenter, contributed a short but amusing 
opinion, admitting that he “had no opportunity to examine the authorities cited in the opinion” 
but nonetheless objected to the doctrine. Id. at 538 (Miller, J., dissenting). Justice Miller’s 
admission likely reflects the considerable chore that legal research was in 1881. 
 52. Id. at 532 (majority opinion); Vargo, supra note 2, at 1580. 
 53. Greenough, 105 U.S. at 529. 
 54. Id. at 532. 
 55. See id. at 534–35 (“In this case the fund from which the dividend will be paid is due 
entirely to the exertions of the petitioners in setting aside the mortgage; and, in most cases, 
though not in this, no single creditor, nor any three or four of them, have a sufficient interest 
to enable them to undertake the conduct of the proceedings without positive loss of money if 
they cannot tax the expenses on the fund, for those expenses will usually exceed the dividend 
on their debts.” (quoting Judge Lowell, Massachusetts)); Christopher R. Leslie, The Signifi-
cance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 
71, 72–73 (2007) (“Collective action problems exist whenever it is in individuals’ self-interest 
not to contribute to a group activity even though all of the individuals would be better off if 
everyone were to contribute. In a resulting irony, each individual is made worse off by pursu-
ing her own self-interest.”); see also Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 8, at 1095; Leslie, supra 
at 74 (“Corporate wrongs often create collective action problems.”). 
 56. Greenough, 105 U.S. at 532. 
 57. In re Osofsky, 50 F.2d 925, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). Judge Woolsey wrote:  
Indeed the situation may very well be compared . . . to salvage at sea.  
In salvage cases courts have wisely come to think that, as a matter of public 
policy, it is necessary to give such adequate reward to a successful salvor as will 
make others to whom salvage situations are presented interested in attempting 
salvage operations. There must always be a flavor of generosity in the awards to 
success in order that an appetite for effort may be stimulated. 
Id. The analogy came naturally for Judge Woolsey, who was known for his “brilliant and 
poignantly phrased decisions” and his expertise in admiralty law. John M. Woolsey, Retired 
Jurist, 68: Former Federal Judge Here Dies—Expert on Plagiarism Made “Ulysses” Ruling, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1945, at 15. 
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abundant ground for instituting the proceedings.”58 The litigation fees, the Court said, 
were part of the administration expenses of the trust and must therefore be borne 
thereby.59 
Finally, mindful of the possible incentives created by fee shifting, the Court made 
several limitations to the exceptions abundantly clear: Fee allowances must be “made 
with moderation and a jealous regard to the rights of those who are interested in the 
fund,” considering whether the legal expenditures were “fairly and honestly made” 
and reasonable under the circumstances.60 The Court also reversed one expense item 
granted by the trial court: fees “for the personal services and private expenses of the 
complainant.”61 These expenses, like excessive attorney’s fees,  
would present too great a temptation to parties to intermeddle in the man-
agement of valuable property or funds in which they have only the inter-
est of creditors, and that perhaps only to a small amount, if they could 
calculate upon the allowance of a salary for their time and of having all 
their private expenses paid.62 
The Court struck a balance. It did not necessarily want to encourage all suits to 
remedy illegal pecuniary loss in a common benefit; suits to recover de minimis losses 
which would unnecessarily trouble the fund managers and courts, for example, 
should still be discouraged due to the inconvenience of litigation. Therefore, the 
Court took a carefully measured approach. First, it made plain that the cause must 
accrue as a result of some mismanagement of the fund. Second, it limited fee recov-
ery to only inarguably legal fees—and even then, only legal fees that were moderate 
and that reasonably contributed to the pecuniary gain of all participants in the fund.63 
The exception balanced competing objectives: encouraging suits for the common 
benefit where a collective action problem might prevent any suit, while ensuring that 
fee awards remain sufficiently modest so as to discourage unwarranted “intermed-
dling.” After all, business managers must be free to work without the specter of per-
petual judicial oversight prompted by litigious busybodies. Finally, the Court, based 
upon its experience and survey of cases employing the common benefit exception, 
trusted that “the eminent [trial] judges under whose direction many of these cases 
have been administered” had the institutional capacity to exercise discretion and 
strike the necessary balance in application.64 And it did all of this without as much 
as a solitary reference to the Court’s categorical statements from 1796 in Arcambel.65 
                                                                                                                 
 
 58. Greenough, 105 U.S. at 532. 
 59. Id. at 532–33. 
 60. Id. at 536–37. 
 61. Id. at 537. 
 62. Id. at 538. 
 63. See, for example, Central Railroad & Banking Co. of Georgia v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 
128 (1885), where the Court appeared to proscribe fee awards above the agreed-upon rate 
between attorney and client as one categorical limitation. 
 64. Greenough, 105 U.S. at 536. 
 65. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text. 
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B. Substantial Benefit Exception 
The substantial benefit doctrine66 removed two constraints from the common fund 
doctrine: First, the doctrine allows a fee award where litigation confers benefits not 
upon a fund, but upon an insular, identifiable group of nonparties.67 Second, the doc-
trine allows a fee award where litigation confers substantial, nonpecuniary benefits 
upon nonparties.68 
1. Nonparty Beneficiaries 
The Supreme Court first recognized the substantial benefit exception in the 1939 
case of Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank,69 which allowed the plaintiff to recover 
fees for securing pecuniary benefits for a group of nonparties. Lottie Sprague depos-
ited about $5000 at Ticonic National Bank to be held in trust.70 Ticonic secured the 
deposited funds by earmarking some bonds, pursuant to statute.71 The bank went into 
receivership and the receivers failed to “take over the trust under which the bonds 
were held.”72 Sprague (along with the trust beneficiary) brought suit against the re-
ceivers to establish a lien on the bonds for her trust deposit and enforce the bank’s 
fiduciary duties.73 But Sprague was not alone: fourteen other trusts were secured by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 66. The substantial benefit and common fund exceptions have proven versatile. Com-
monly collapsed into one analysis, courts have awarded fees in antitrust litigation, mass dis-
aster torts, class actions, and union litigation, to name a few. See Vargo, supra note 2, at 1581, 1583. 
 67. See Vargo, supra note 2, at 1582; infra Part I.B.1. 
 68. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 69. 307 U.S. 161 (1939). One scholar traces the substantial benefit exception to the 
Supreme Court’s 1921 decision in Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373 (1921). Vargo, supra note 2, 
at 1582. While the Court in Winton cites to Greenough and Pettus, Winton did not involve 
attorney’s fees shifting. In a bit of an odd posture, the Court sitting in equity considered fee 
awards to individuals who, under contract with certain members of the Choctaw Nation, suc-
cessfully lobbied Congress for a law to protect certain financial and property assets for the 
tribe. Winton, 225 U.S. at 391–93. First, the Court held that these circumstances fell within 
the Greenough doctrine, even as the fees were not attorney’s fees. See id. at 394. Second, the 
Court noted that the claimants had contracts with “large numbers of Mississippi Choctaws,” 
indicating that they were not “intermeddlers.” Id. However, the Court took a hard look at each 
of the fee claims and disallowed six of the fee claims for not being “substantially instrumental 
in producing a result beneficial” to the entire tribe. Id. at 394–95, 397–98. For example, one 
claimant’s actions benefitted several individual members of the tribe, but did “nothing to ad-
vance the claims” of the broader tribe. Id. at 397. Another claimant failed to show that the 
legislation was actually the result of his services. Id. at 398. Only one of the seven claims was 
sufficiently meritorious to warrant remand for further factual findings. Id. 
While Winton stands as an interesting articulation of how courts may evaluate the propriety 
of fee requests under the common fund and substantial benefit exceptions, a Westlaw search 
reveals that the Supreme Court has never cited the case for its fees holdings. Furthermore, no 
published circuit court of appeals opinion has cited the relevant Westlaw headnote. 
 70. Sprague, 307 U.S. at 162. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 28 F. Supp. 229, 230 (D. Me. 1939), modified, 110 
F.2d 174 (1st Cir. 1940). 
 73. Id. 
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the same bonds and were thus in the same situation.74 By succeeding on the merits 
in her claim, Sprague “necessarily established the claims” of the fourteen nonparties 
as to the lien on the bonds.75 Yet it was Sprague alone who bore the expense of liti-
gation, and,  
although the total assets of the bank were not sufficient to satisfy the 
unsecured creditors, the proceeds of the bonds [which had secured the 
trusts’ funds] were more than sufficient to discharge all trust obligations; 
and she therefore prayed the court for reasonable counsel fees and litiga-
tion expenses to be paid out of the proceeds of the bonds.76 
The Supreme Court, citing its “historic equity jurisdiction,”77 remanded the cause 
to allow Sprague’s prayer to be heard by the trial court in the first instance. The Court 
rejected as meaningless the difference between suits generating benefits for a set 
class or previously existing fund, as in Greenough, and a suit like Sprague, where 
the decision generated pecuniary benefits for an identifiable group of nonparties.78 
In the former, “one professes to sue representatively or formally makes a fund avail-
able for others.”79 In the latter, “a fund is for all practical purposes created for the 
benefit of others” by the plaintiff’s success.80 While the intent to benefit others with 
litigation may well “be a relevant circumstance in making the fund liable for [an 
attorney’s] costs,”81 the Court determined that drawing a line between the two types 
of cases would be unduly formalistic and advance no particular policy. 
But, as the Court again made clear, these “allowances are appropriate only in ex-
ceptional cases and for dominating reasons of justice.”82 On remand, the court was 
to make an individualized determination as to whether fees would be appropriate in 
this case, taking into account how to best achieve justice among the plaintiff, the 
particular nonparty beneficiaries, and the other creditors in bankruptcy who could 
not possibly be paid in full from the bank’s funds.83 
2. Nonpecuniary Benefit 
In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,84 decided in 1970, the Supreme Court embraced 
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. Sprague, 307 U.S. at 166; Sprague, 28 F. Supp. at 230. 
 75. Sprague, 307 U.S. at 166. 
 76. Id. at 163. 
 77. Id. at 164. 
 78. See id.  at 166. 
 79. Id. at 167. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. On remand, the district and appellate courts assessed the impact of awarding fees 
on nonparty creditors and concluded that “the District Court was warranted in concluding that 
the trivial disadvantage to the unsecured creditors was not a significant countervailing consid-
eration. The general creditors have already received nearly ninety per cent of their claims, and 
$1,214.51 distributed among them would mean very little to any of them.” Sprague v. Ticonic 
Nat’l Bank, 110 F.2d 174, 177 (1st Cir. 1940), modifying 28 F. Supp. 229 (D. Me. 1939). 
 84. 396 U.S. 375 (1970). 
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the second extension to the common fund doctrine, allowing a plaintiff to recover 
attorney’s fees for achieving nonpecuniary benefits for an identifiable group of peo-
ple.85 Two shareholders in the Electro Auto-Lite Company brought a derivative suit 
that successfully rescinded a merger approved by shareholder vote with a materially 
false proxy statement, in violation of securities laws—a suit not necessarily destined 
to produce a monetary recovery.86 This, the Court said, in no way interfered with its 
historic equitable power to award attorney’s fees.87 
The lack of an actual pecuniary recovery in the corporate context poses no prob-
lem when the benefits recovered are “capable of expression in monetary terms, if 
only by estimating the increase in market value of the shares attributable to the suc-
cessful litigation.”88 But frequently a corporate action could impede or destroy some 
other “essential right to the stockholder’s interest,” one that is not capable of deter-
minate pecuniary measurement.89 The Court, in this case, identified an accurate 
proxy statement as such an “essential right” by looking to statute: Congress imposed 
strict proxy requirements and determined that “fair and informed corporate suffrage” 
is important to a corporation’s well-being.90 Finally, there may be no other way to 
enforce a shareholder’s right to an informed proxy vote other than to sue; “[t]o award 
attorneys’ fees in such a suit . . . is not to saddle the unsuccessful party with the 
expenses but to impose them on the class that has benefited from them and that would 
have had to pay them had it brought the suit.”91 
Again, the Court carefully cabined the exception, noting first that a nonpecuniary 
benefit “must be something more than technical in its consequence” to qualify as a 
substantial benefit.92 Second, as in the other exceptions heretofore discussed, award-
ing attorney’s fees was shifting fees not to the opposing party per se but to the other 
beneficiaries of the action (namely, the corporation and its shareholders). Further-
more, while the plaintiffs in Mills were entitled to attorney’s fees for securing the 
rescission of the transaction, the cause still had to be remanded to determine whether 
further relief would be appropriate.93 If so, the meaningfulness of that further relief 
could be a factor in determining whether an additional award of attorney’s fees would 
be appropriate.94 
C. Private Attorney General Exception 
The exegesis of the private attorney general exception in the lower courts pro-
duced a bevy of opinions and language exalting the role of equity in ensuring just 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. See id. at 389–97. 
 86. Id. at 377, 392–93, 397. 
 87. See id. at 392–93. 
 88. Id. at 395. 
 89. Id. at 396 (quoting Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass’n, 101 N.W.2d 423, 
427 (Minn. 1960)). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 396–97. 
 92. Id. at 396 (quoting Bosch, 101 N.W.2d at 427). 
 93. Id. at 396–97. 
 94. See id. at 396. 
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outcomes, though without a uniform test.95 The district court’s decision in La Raza 
Unida v. Volpe,96 endorsed by the Eighth Circuit97 and approved by several others,98 
perhaps best sets out the factors generally evaluated by courts in awarding attorney’s 
fees against a defendant99: “1) the effectuation of strong public policies; 2) the fact 
that numerous people received benefits from plaintiffs’ litigation success; 3) the fact 
that only a private party could have been expected to bring this action.”100  
This exception justified attorney’s fees awards in myriad situations where courts 
felt compelled to allow some measure of pecuniary recovery to mitigate the expense 
of litigating for public benefits—for example, in environmental and racial discrimi-
nation cases. The La Raza Unida court awarded fees where plaintiffs succeeded in 
enjoining construction of a new highway.101 The court found that the defendants 
failed to comply with a variety of environmental and relocation procedures before 
approving the highway,102 which would have displaced 5000 residents and destroyed 
“the last remaining parks in southern Alameda County.”103 In Knight v. Auciello,104 
the First Circuit awarded fees in a § 1982 suit where the defendant refused to rent an 
apartment to a black tenant because of his race, even though the statute did not ex-
pressly provide for attorney’s fees.105 As in the other equitable exceptions, district 
courts were instructed to take many factors into consideration when assessing 
whether to shift fees and determining a fair award.106 
                                                                                                                 
 
 95. Cf. The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure—Awards 
of Attorneys’ Fees Under Private Attorney General Rationale, 89 HARV. L. REV. 170, 179 
(1975) [hereinafter Awards of Attorneys’ Fees] (describing a lack of “judicially manageable 
standards” in applying the private attorney general exception). 
 96. 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff’d sub nom. La Raza Unida of S. Alameda Cty. v. 
Volpe, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 97. Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143, 146 (8th Cir. 1974). 
 98. E.g., Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973) (Tuttle, J.); Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1333 (1st Cir. 1973); see, e.g., Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 
F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 99. See Peter Nussbaum, Attorney’s Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
301, 329 (1973) (describing La Raza Unida as the “most significant” of the private attorney 
general cases because of the “reasoned analysis provided by the court”); see, e.g., Taylor v. 
Perini, 503 F.2d 899, 905 (6th Cir. 1974) (determining that fee shifting is available where a 
plaintiff brings an action with “no potential substantial award of damages” to vindicate 
constitutional rights of “an entire class”), vacated, 421 U.S. 982 (1975); Wilderness Soc’y v. 
Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Alyeska Pipeline 
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
 100. La Raza Unida, 57 F.R.D. at 101. 
 101. La Raza Unida, 57 F.R.D. 94; La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 
1971), aff’d sub nom. La Raza Unida of S. Alameda Cty. v. Volpe, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 102. La Raza Unida, 337 F. Supp. 221, 233–34. 
 103. La Raza Unida, 57 F.R.D. at 100. 
 104. 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972) (per curiam). 
 105. Id.; see also Lee v. S. Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971) (concluding 
that “attorney’s fees are part of the effective remedy . . . to carry out the congressional policy” 
of 42 U.S.C. § 1982). 
 106. See, e.g., Incarcerated Men of Allen Cty. Jail v. Fair, 507 F.2d 281, 289 (6th Cir. 
1974) (Celebrezze, J.). 
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In the absence of statutory authorization for fee shifting, the lower courts latched 
on to language about the tremendous breadth of equity from several Supreme Court 
decisions, including the decisions discussed above.107 The D.C. Circuit, for example, 
in Wilderness Society v. Morton (which would eventually be reversed in Alyeska 
Pipeline), relied heavily on dicta from Hall v. Cole,108 which certainly could be read 
to support a broad private attorney general exception:  
Although the traditional American rule ordinarily disfavors the allow-
ance of attorneys’ fees in the absence of statutory or contractual author-
ization, federal courts, in the exercise of their equitable powers, may 
award attorneys’ fees when the interests of justice so require. Indeed, the 
power to award such fees “is part of the original authority of the chan-
cellor to do equity in a particular situation” and federal courts do not 
hesitate to exercise this inherent equitable power whenever “overriding 
considerations indicate the need for such a recovery.”109 
The private attorney general exception extended the benefits of the common fund 
and substantial benefit exceptions (diffusion of litigation costs, enforcement of legal 
norms for which a collective action problem exists, and flexibility for trial judges to 
ferret out “unworthy” plaintiffs) to a much broader class of plaintiffs. Under the com-
mon fund exception, fee recovery is limited to plaintiffs pursuing benefits on behalf 
of a group of beneficiaries with an established fund. In developing the substantial 
benefit exception, courts emphasized that some successful suits benefit many others 
not party to a lawsuit.110 But, as courts applying the private attorney general excep-
tion recognized, these broadly beneficial suits are most certainly not limited to suits 
benefiting an established common fund.111 Implicit in the private attorney general 
exception is the judgment that the common fund exception is underinclusive—it fails 
to adequately promote some types of desirable suits, even as it rewards plaintiffs for 
bringing others.112 The entire public is harmed by certain behaviors, such as pollution 
or discrimination, and the private attorney general exception encouraged suits to 
eradicate such behaviors. 
Achieving this desired effect required dispensing with a key limiting requirement 
of the common fund exception—namely, that the litigation benefits a specific group 
                                                                                                                 
 
 107. See, e.g., Wilderness Soc’y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1029–30 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en 
banc), rev’d sub nom. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); 
Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836, 841 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 108. 412 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 109. Id. at 4–5 (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted) (first quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l 
Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939); then quoting Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 
391–92 (1970)). 
 110. See, e.g., Incarcerated Men, 507 F.2d at 283, 285. 
 111. See, e.g., id. 285–86 (rejecting substantial benefit exception in suit by incarcerated 
individuals to address terrible prison conditions but embracing private attorney general excep-
tion because suit benefited not only “the present inmates of the jail but also all future inmates 
of the facility” and fee award ensured that “the vindication of public constitutional rights 
[would] not depend upon the financial resources of the particular individuals who seek to se-
cure those rights”). 
 112. See, e.g., id. at 285. 
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of persons. Instead, in operation, the benefitted group must be broad.113 Anything 
smaller would likely fail to meet the importance or breadth requirements of the pri-
vate attorney general exception.114 Furthermore, while the common fund exception 
shifted fees to the group of beneficiaries, the private attorney general exception pro-
vides no defined group to which fees can be shifted. Instead, and still under a com-
pensatory rationale, it is the defeated defendant (which, in suits against public enti-
ties, may be the benefiting taxpayers) who must pay for the attorney who bested it.  
Thus, while the exception carried with it heretofore unrealized, substantial bene-
fits—perhaps even an increase in net just results—it also exacted additional costs. 
The courts of appeals recognized that defendants may frequently be faced not only 
with plaintiffs who had greater incentive to litigate, but also higher-risk litigation.115 
As before, the exception accorded courts additional flexibility with which they could 
pursue equitable results, but this equity moved even further from an American 
“Rule” toward, perhaps, an American Standard.116 The Supreme Court was not will-
ing to take that path without a clear congressional directive. 
II. ALYESKA PIPELINE: AN UNSCRIPTED RESET FOR THE AMERICAN RULE  
In Alyeska Pipeline, a group of environmental groups brought suit to enjoin the 
Secretary of the Interior from permitting construction of a trans-Alaskan oil pipe-
line.117 The environmentalists alleged that Alyeska Pipeline failed to complete the 
required environmental impact analyses under the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) of 1969118 and that the requested right-of-way width exceeded the re-
quirements in the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA) of 1920.119 During the first round 
through the D.C. Circuit, the court reinstated the injunction dissolved by the district 
court, but solely on the highly technical width requirements of the MLA to avoid the 
more complicated NEPA issue.120 Congress then amended the MLA to allow pipeline 
construction to proceed.121 During the second trip to the D.C. Circuit, the court 
awarded attorney’s fees on a private attorney general theory.122 The combination of 
the plaintiffs’ efforts to protect the environment and to stop Alyeska Pipeline from 
                                                                                                                 
 
 113. See, e.g., Incarcerated Men, 507 F.2d 281. 
 114. Cf. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (requiring, inter alia, 
that plaintiff’s litigation benefit “numerous people” to justify an award of attorney’s fees), 
aff’d sub nom. La Raza Unida of S. Alameda Cty. v. Volpe, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 115. E.g., Wilderness Soc’y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc), 
rev’d sub nom. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
 116. But cf. Company Information, AM. STANDARD, http://www.americanstandard-us.com 
/companyinfo/overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/5PP5-7E3H] (describing the history of Ameri-
can Standard, the plumbing company that invented the “one-piece toilet”). 
 117. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 421 U.S. at 241. 
 118. Id. at 241–44 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–47 (1970)). 
 119. Id. (citing 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970)).  
 120. Id. at 244 (citing Wilderness Soc’y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en 
banc), appeal after remand, 495 F.2d 1026, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. 
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 421 U.S. 240). 
 121. Id. at 244–45; Act of Nov. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, tit. I, § 101, 87 Stat. 576 
(codified at 30 U.S.C. § 185 (Supp. III 1974)). 
 122. Id. at 245–46. 
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circumventing the plain language of the MLA constituted the “compelling interest” 
that swung the equities in the plaintiffs’ favor.123 
Decided in 1975, Alyeska Pipeline definitively rejected any possibility of a judi-
cially crafted private attorney general exception—or any other new equitable excep-
tion to the American Rule.124 But it did so with a façade of substantive minimalism 
beneath which the Supreme Court purported to defer entirely to Congress’s wishes 
and a lariat of procedural maximalism with which the Court bound dissimilar 
nonparties. 
A. Substantive Minimalism: Take Your Complaints to Congress 
The Supreme Court’s commitment to substantive minimalism dominated the first 
half of the opinion reversing the attorney’s fees award. Illustrative of this are two of 
the Court’s statutory justifications: First, the Court tied its decision—and the near-
absolute supremacy of the American Rule—to a court-costs statute from 1853.125 
Second, the Court asserted that, because Congress had crafted several statutes with 
“specific and explicit provisions” for fee shifting, Congress intended only those stat-
utes to allow attorney’s fee awards.126 And, despite the Court’s megadeference to its 
discerned congressional directive, it doubled down on the validity of the other judi-
cially created exceptions discussed in Part I.127 
There are substantial problems with both of these justifications;128 I highlight just 
a few. The 1853 court-costs statute, as stylistically modified in 1874 and thereafter 
left unchanged until 1948, said: “The following [short list of acceptable costs] and 
no other compensation shall be taxed and allowed to attorneys . . . in the courts of 
the United States . . . except in cases otherwise expressly provided by law.”129 In 
1948, Congress amended the statute, removing the “no other compensation” 
language.130 While the Court pointed to the Reviser’s Note as evidence that the 
amended statute meant only to consolidate statutory provisions and not to change the 
law,131 the Court’s holding clearly engrafted nonexistent statutory language on to the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. Wilderness Soc’y, 479 F.2d at 1032–39 (“Although Congress has now given the go-
ahead to the pipeline on the basis of the impact statement prepared by the Department, this 
appeal helped focus attention in Congress on the major issue raised—the relative merits of a 
trans-Canadian versus a trans-Alaskan route. We take the action of Congress approving the 
impact statement, not as a total rejection of the arguments made on appeal, but rather as a 
recognition that appellants had raised a very substantial question . . . .” (emphasis omitted) 
(footnote omitted) (citations omitted)). 
 124. 421 U.S. 240. 
 125. Id. at 251–60 (citing Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161). 
 126. Id. at 260–63. 
 127. Id. at 257–59. 
 128. See generally id. at 272–88 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Awards of Attorneys’ Fees, 
supra note 95 (criticizing the majority’s textual and historical analysis). 
 129. See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 255 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Revised Statutes of 1874 § 823). 
 130. Id. at 256 n.29 (“The 1948 Code does not contain the language used in the 1853 Act 
and carried on for nearly 100 years that the fees prescribed by the statute ‘and no other com-
pensation shall be taxed and allowed’ . . . .”). 
 131. Id. at 256 n.29. 
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fees statute. “[N]othing,” said the Court, “in the 1948 Code indicates a congressional 
intention to depart from that rule”132—except, of course, the change in the statutory 
language. Furthermore, the Supreme Court recognized the common fund and sub-
stantial benefit exceptions, making broad observations about its historic powers at 
equity, without ever being troubled by the 1853 statute.133 Alyeska Pipeline is a stark 
retreat from the Court’s ode to equity in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Company,134 de-
cided a mere five years prior. Combined, this history substantially weakens the 
Court’s claim to a definitive statutory mandate. 
The Court’s second statutory justification, that Congress, by including fee-
shifting provisions in some statutes, meant to stop the courts from exercising their 
equitable powers in other situations, suffers from similar shortcomings. First, the ra-
tionale proves far too much. Recognizing that Congress, too, may provide for fee 
shifting does not explain why courts exercising their historic equitable powers could 
not also do so. The Court also failed to explain how it discerned that Congress, by 
enacting several statutes with fee-shifting provisions, intended to prevent fee shifting 
under other statutes, instead of merely ensuring that fee shifting would be available 
in certain situations. Congress just as easily could have made clear that it did not 
want fee shifting either in particular statutes or as a general proposition. Congress’s 
actual activity proves Justice Marshall’s argument in dissent just as much as it proves 
the majority’s position.135 Thus, it should have been uncontroversial for this “tie” to 
result in a true judicial determination. 
Ultimately, “there appears to be no principled basis for construing [the fee stat-
utes] to preclude fee awards under the private attorney general rationale while pre-
serving equitable power in both bad faith and common benefit situations.”136 Given 
the well-documented judicial development of the Rule and the flimsiness of the fee 
statute upon which the Court relied, it clearly was the judiciary’s established place 
to craft exceptions as justice required, subject to Congress’s corrective actions. In 
fact, by attributing to Congress such a hardline intent with such insufficient evidence, 
the Court may well have undermined Congress’s actual intent; perhaps Congress was 
actually content with the status quo. But so construing the statute also undermined 
the carefully built equitable foundations of the other exceptions. The Court’s holding 
required future decisions outside the narrow pillars of the common fund and substan-
tial benefit exceptions to spurn the usual guideposts of equitable decision making 
(such as balancing of incentives and fairness among both parties and nonparties) with 
a mere citation to Alyeska or the court-costs statute.  
The Court concluded that it “need labor the matter no further. It appears to us that 
the rule suggested here and adopted by the Court of Appeals would make major in-
roads on a policy matter that Congress has reserved for itself.”137 Despite the Court’s 
one-paragraph policy analysis to support rejection of the private attorney general 
                                                                                                                 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. See supra Part I.A–B. 
 134. 396 U.S. 375 (1970); see supra Part I.B.2. 
 135. See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 272–88 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Awards of Attor-
neys’ Fees, supra note 95. 
 136. Awards of Attorneys’ Fees, supra note 95, at 175. 
 137. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 269. 
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exception,138 the Court made it crystal clear that the costs statute was performing the 
heavy lifting. It is unclear if this policy analysis is at all a part of the ratio decidendi139 
or, if it is, how critical it is to the decision—but it is clearly truncated, one-sided, and 
subordinate in location and length to the rest of the opinion. This represents a terrific 
departure from the Supreme Court’s careful weighing of the equities in its earlier 
American Rule jurisprudence and, as the next Section argues, fails to sufficiently 
justify the seismic shift it imposed upon the judiciary’s equitable power and 
responsibility. 
B. Procedural Maximalism 
As Justice Marshall and other commentators have noted, the world of possible 
outcomes in Alyeska Pipeline was not dichotomous.140 The Court could have em-
braced a result other than affirming the private attorney general exception as applied 
or completely eradicating the exception, as the Court ultimately did. It could have 
decided that, under the private attorney general framework, the equities did not suf-
ficiently favor the plaintiff, as the dissenters from the D.C. Circuit urged (and perhaps 
with some reason).141 
Or the Court could have limited the exception to allow fee awards “only where 
constitutional rights have been vindicated” instead of the broader category of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 138. The Court highlighted the difficulty in determining what statutes are “important 
enough to warrant” fee shifting without express congressional guidance; the incongruity of the 
express unavailability of fees against the United States under the then-enacted 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2412; and numerous other questions that might require resolution through litigation, such as 
how district court awards should be reviewed, whether the exception would apply to plaintiffs 
and defendants, and whether fees should be mandatory or discretionary. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 
U.S. at 263–64. Of course, if the Court had not determined that it was without power to rec-
ognize an equitable exception to the American Rule, the Court itself could have made reason-
able policy determinations on these issues or provided guidance to the lower courts so that 
they could make reasonable policy determinations. 
 139. For an intriguing discussion of how to identify the ratio decidendi of a particular case, 
see, for example, Charles W. Collier, Precedent and Legal Authority: A Critical History, 1988 
WIS. L. REV. 771 and Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 
YALE L.J. 161 (1930). At least one view holds that “the ratio decidendi is the rule or principle 
that the precedent-setting court considered to be necessary for its decision.” Collier, supra, at 
799 (emphasis omitted) (citing Rolf Sartorious, The Doctrine of Precedent and the Problem 
of Relevance, 53 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 343, 349–50 (1967)). 
 140. See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 272–88 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Awards of Attor-
neys’ Fees, supra note 95. 
 141. See Wilderness Soc’y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1039–42 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (“I would refuse to compensate appellants’ attorneys for any work 
they did on the NEPA issue—the main thrust of which would have made us further dependent 
upon another foreign nation, albeit our good neighbor, the Queen of the Snows to the north, 
for resources vital to our well-being as an independent nation. . . . In addition to recovery on 
the basis of an issue never decided by this court, appellants’ victory here is premised on the 
narrow statutory interpretation issue on which they actually prevailed on the merits. . . . [T]he 
width limitation surely was not the motivating force behind appellants’ decision to institute 
legal action.”), rev’d sub nom. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. 240; id. at 1042–46 (Wilkey, J., 
dissenting). 
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important statutory rights.142 This would have negated many of the Court’s concerns 
about dealing with the “important rights” standard and its uncertainty.143 It also 
would have shown sufficient respect for Congress by leaving the responsibility of 
determining which statutory rights warranted fee shifting to it. Furthermore, it is cer-
tainly reasonable to conclude that constitutional rights normatively warrant greater 
protection than other rights, and attorney’s fees would aid in vindicating such rights.  
Finally, the Court could have rejected the private attorney general exception while 
still maintaining the courts’ time-honored powers at equity to do justice in the par-
ticular case, and recognize or develop new exceptions as necessary. Alyeska Pipeline 
rejected all middle-road proposals, including manageable solutions such as these. 
In so doing, the Court bound future distinguishable cases with parties that were 
not before the Court.144 Instead of ruling as narrowly as possible, the Court ruled as 
broadly as possible. Even if the private attorney general exception was unaligned 
with congressional wishes or was otherwise unwise as a matter of equity or some 
other policy basis, the Court need not have closed the doors to future litigants who 
may have had compelling interests warranting independent consideration. 
By ruling broadly, the Supreme Court allowed an accident of timing to lock in the 
common fund, substantial benefit, and punitive145 exceptions as the sole equitable 
exceptions to the Rule. Indeed, the Court admitted as much: “Congress has not repu-
diated the judicially fashioned [common benefit and punitive] exceptions to the gen-
eral rule against allowing substantial attorneys’ fees . . . .”146 Even if the tradeoffs 
from the earlier exceptions were justified through reasoned decisions, stopping doc-
trinal development altogether was not. The Court’s abbreviated policy discussion 
touched only on the private attorney general exception it faced.147 It offered abso-
lutely no policy justification for the solution it selected once it rejected the circuit 
courts’ majority position. The litigants having to deal with the American Rule’s new 
statutory wig deserved more. 
III. CATALYST DOCTRINE: EQUITY REDUX 
Congress stepped into the Alyeska Pipeline void and filled it with myriad statutes 
to ensure that important rights could be vindicated. The legislative history to the Civil 
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976,148 the model fee-shifting statute passed 
in the Alyeska Pipeline aftermath,149 made Congress’s intent perfectly clear: “The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 142. Awards of Attorneys’ Fees, supra note 95, at 180. 
 143. See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 263–64. 
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purpose of this amendment is to remedy anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws cre-
ated by [Alyeska Pipeline.]”150 Many of these statutes provided for fees to a “prevail-
ing party.”151 The judiciary, now without the equitable power to provide for fee shift-
ing as justice mandates, set out to interpret this congressional response; the Supreme 
Court, once more displeased with the lower courts, rejected this interpretation in fa-
vor of its own, higher standard. 
One by one each circuit filled the interpretive void left by the new slew of “pre-
vailing party” statutes. Each circuit, save one, settled upon the “catalyst theory” to 
give meaning to the term “prevailing.”152 Simply put, the catalyst theory awards at-
torney’s fees to the plaintiff if “it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit 
brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct.”153 This required a 
showing that “(1) ‘[t]he defendant provided “some of the benefit sought” by the law-
suit’; (2) ‘the suit stated a genuine claim, i.e., one that was at least “colorable,” not 
“frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless”’; and (3) the plaintiff’s suit ‘was a 
“substantial” or “significant” cause of defendant’s action providing relief.’”154 Some 
circuits further required that the plaintiff show that success was the result of “threat 
of victory” and not “nuisance” or “threat of expense.”155  
For example, in DeMier v. Gondles,156 the Fourth Circuit (which would eventually 
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be the sole circuit to expressly reject the catalyst doctrine) affirmed a grant of attor-
ney’s fees in a § 1983 suit challenging the Arlington County Sheriff’s Office strip 
search policy. DeMier was arrested for playing a stereo too loudly; Weitzel was ar-
rested for writing obscene words on a traffic ticket.157 Both were strip-searched.158 
The plaintiffs sued in November 1980.159 About one month later, the sheriff’s office 
temporarily suspended its strip search policy, and in April 1981, the state legislature 
enacted a statute to cabin the sheriff’s strip search authority.160 Shortly thereafter, the 
plaintiffs moved for voluntary dismissal.161 In a typical catalyst-doctrine analysis,162 
the court explained the suit’s influence on the changed strip search policy: 
As the district court noted, at the time this suit was filed the strip search 
policy had recently survived challenge in a separate suit and the Sheriff 
had resolutely declared his intention to maintain the policy. According 
to the numerous exhibits of newspaper articles and editorials submitted 
by appellees, this suit caused considerable publicity, both locally and na-
tionwide, and “increased political pressure” regarding the policy. The 
conclusion appears inescapable that even if other complaints contributed 
to the change in policy, this suit was a major contribution.163 
On that basis, the court affirmed the fee award. 
In Foremaster v. City of St. George,164 the Tenth Circuit reversed a denial of plain-
tiff’s fees in an Establishment Clause165 challenge to St. George, Utah’s practice of 
granting electricity subsidies to the local Mormon temple. After Foremaster filed 
suit, the city terminated the electricity subsidy.166 The district court determined that 
Foremaster lacked standing and dismissed his complaint but found that the city “ter-
minated the subsidy to reduce tension in the community and to save time and expense 
of litigating Foremaster’s lawsuit.”167 The court of appeals reversed the district court 
on the standing issue; determined that city’s conduct actually ran afoul of the 
Establishment Clause; and, on the basis of the district court’s finding that the city 
terminated the subsidy in part to avoid litigating Foremaster’s claim, remanded the 
cause for a determination of attorney’s fees.168 
DeMier and Foremaster are examples of how the catalyst doctrine compensated 
plaintiffs for effecting legal change, even when their actions ended short of settle-
ment or judgment. It was a means of implementing Congress’s express desire (which 
was lacking before Alyeska Pipeline) to encourage private persons to enforce certain 
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laws. The catalyst doctrine allowed each court to evaluate the proceeding before it 
and fashion a result based upon that evaluation—not based upon the presence or ab-
sence of a formality. 
However, courts also refused to mechanically grant attorney’s fees whenever the 
defendant changed its conduct. Not terribly unlike a court operating in equity, the 
lower courts understood the catalyst doctrine to require a weighing of competing 
interests and values. In Grano v. Barry, for example, the D.C. Circuit vacated and 
remanded an order granting a fee award to citizens who successfully enjoined the 
District of Columbia’s issuance of a permit to demolish a historic tavern until its fate 
could be decided by initiative vote.169 Even though the initiative was eventually de-
clared unconstitutional by a different court and the tavern was demolished, the court 
of appeals agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs were prevailing parties 
because the plaintiffs’ actions guaranteed that the “initiative still had the potential to 
mean something.”170 That another court later undercut the litigants’ ultimate goal 
was inapposite to the determination of whether the plaintiffs’ litigation in federal 
court produced the desired relief.171 
However, this was not the end of the inquiry. The court still had to determine 
whether the award of fees was ultimately just: 
Apart from the unusual circumstance that the vote on the Rhodes 
Tavern initiative was ultimately declared unconstitutional, the District 
has also stressed its uniquely frustrating position in the litigation: it had 
no choice under District law but to issue the demolition permit once the 
conditions precedent were fulfilled. No matter which course it 
followed—granting or withholding the permit—either the plaintiffs or 
Carr would have claimed it was acting unconstitutionally. In such a 
squeeze play, it argued, it would not be equitable to assess attorneys’ fees 
against it.172 
The D.C. Circuit remanded the cause to the trial court to consider whether these 
“special circumstances” undermined the fairness of the fee award.173 
Other courts, too, ensured that fee shifting was in the interests of justice. The 
Seventh Circuit scrutinized fee requests premised upon settlement agreements to 
ensure that the defendant would not be slapped with attorney’s fees for providing a 
plaintiff with “wholly gratuitous” relief.174 In Hooper v. Demco, Inc., Hooper sought 
insurance coverage for an up-and-coming cancer treatment to treat his aggressive 
bone marrow cancer.175 The insurance company rejected the request as 
“investigative” and “experimental” under Hooper’s policy and Hooper brought 
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 170. Id. at 1109 (emphasis omitted). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1111. 
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suit.176 The parties quickly settled and the insurance company “spearheaded a 
charitable fund-raising effort” that led to the company and various charities covering 
the entirety of Hooper’s treatment expenses.177 Hooper died after treatment and 
before the appeal.178 Hooper’s estate contended that it should be awarded attorney’s 
fees under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The court rejected the 
request as entirely gratuitous: 
In this case the defendant did not coldly turn its back on its employee 
with a cursory “See you in court” but instead, sidestepped its own health 
plan by arranging for outside help for the plaintiff’s medical bills. These 
actions are all the more respectable in light of the evidence which sup-
ported the defendant’s position in the litigation.179 
Hooper demonstrated a careful weighing of tradeoffs. If by trying to assist a plain-
tiff to recover from an injury a defendant would open itself to potentially substantial 
attorney’s fees shifting without regard to the merit of the lawsuit, the defendant may 
well forego the gratuitous activity. Such a rule would be detrimental to all of society 
by discouraging amicable resolution of disputes. The cost of occasionally diminish-
ing a plaintiff’s fee recovery in court is a small price to pay for maintaining proper 
incentives for achieving mutually beneficial alternatives. 
Grano and Hooper illustrated that courts were cognizant that fee shifting could 
have undesirable, unintended consequences if left unchecked. The catalyst doctrine 
gave the courts sufficient room to develop a fee-shifting rule that would (in their 
view) carry out Congress’s mandate but not offend principles of equity or discourage 
desirable behavior. In a sense, then, the courts understood Congress’s corrective ac-
tions post-Alyeska Pipeline to require a return not necessarily to the status quo ante, 
but to the foundations of the equitable exceptions to the American Rule: evaluating 
and balancing litigation incentives, considering the impact of a fee award upon non-
parties, and trying to ensure that some types of important litigation would not suc-
cumb to a collective action problem. And the courts did so with some support: 
Congress designed fee shifting to “allow courts to provide the familiar remedy of 
reasonable counsel fees to prevailing parties.”180 As Part I establishes, granting 
attorney’s fees in an equitable fashion was quintessentially familiar to the courts and 
the result of decades of doctrinal development of the American Rule. While perhaps 
imperfect, these cases demonstrate that the catalyst doctrine was a workable solution 
to advance clear congressional objectives. 
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IV. BUCKHANNON: DON’T LET THE FACTS GET IN THE WAY OF THE TRUTH 
Buckhannon was a battleground upon which the conservative and liberal wings of 
the Court duked it out over competing notions of statutory interpretation,181 the per-
suasive value of dicta and circuit court unanimity,182 and the policy implications of 
each wing’s preferred interpretation of “prevailing party.”183 The Court rejected the 
catalyst doctrine. Instead, the Court held, a party “prevails” under fee-shifting stat-
utes only upon earning a result christened with “judicial imprimatur.”184 Without 
some sort of judicial signature, be it on a settlement agreement or a consent decree, 
a party may not recover attorney’s fees even if the party ultimately receives all other 
requested relief. The prevailing fivesome of Chief Justice Rehnquist (delivering the 
Court’s opinion) and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas preferred 
Black’s Law Dictionary while the dissent, led by Justice Ginsburg, preferred 
Webster’s New International Dictionary. The majority gave the lower courts and its 
own dicta little heed, while the dissent believed they warranted some respect. And 
the majority (especially Justice Scalia in concurrence, joined by Justice Thomas) and 
the dissent took very different views of how its rule would impact litigants appearing 
before the federal courts. 
As in Alyeska Pipeline, Buckhannon’s holding was crafted with a primer of sub-
stantive minimalism and finished with a procedural varnish that was far from mini-
malistic. Section A briefly deals with the substantive minimalism; again, the Court 
took statutory text that may only be fairly described as ambiguous and attributed to 
it an unequivocal interpretation. The balance of this Part, however, deals with the 
Court’s analysis of the policy implications of both its rule and the catalyst doctrine. 
The Court’s empirical assumptions about the efficiency gained by its rule over the 
catalyst doctrine about these implications have given its holding potentially tremen-
dous breadth, again reflecting a lack of procedural minimalism by binding parties not 
before it. Most critical, the evidence culled by Professors Albiston and Nielsen and 
others suggests that these empirical assumptions may well be false. Thus, and as 
courts and academics continue to work out the precedential value of appellate factual 
findings,185 the Court may well have bound parties not before it to a false assumption.  
A. Prevailing Parties: The Battle of the Dictionaries 
The Buckhannon majority’s spin on substantive minimalism divorced the ques-
tion of statutory interpretation from statutory purpose. While not strictly minimalistic 
in the Alyeska Pipeline sense, where the Court declined to embrace its own historic 
authority and instead sloughed it upon Congress, Buckhannon’s minimalism reveals 
the same disregard for the Court’s responsibility to interpret and assess the impact of 
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its holding. And the Court reached this result despite its roughly contemporaneous 
(and later unanimous) recognition that principles of interpretation are “often coun-
tered . . . by some maxim pointing in a different direction.”186 
After a brief explication of the case and a one-paragraph homage to the American 
Rule, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that “Congress employed the term ‘prevail-
ing party,’ a legal term of art.”187 This meant that Black’s Law Dictionary applied,188 
which in turn meant that the catalyst rule must be rejected in favor of the “judicial 
imprimatur” requirement.189 The term “prevailing party” was so clear to the Court, 
in fact, that it did not need to “determine which way [the] various policy arguments 
cut.”190 
According to the Court, these magical words absolved it of the responsibility to 
more carefully probe Congress’s wishes.191 But even the likes of Justice Scalia have 
recognized that “[a] textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather than ob-
structs the document’s purpose should be favored.”192 That is, even if Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and company (including Justice Scalia) sincerely believed that they had 
trod upon the definition that they would have intended had they drafted the statute, 
it does not follow that it was the most appropriate interpretation of what Congress 
had written. Four colleagues and myriad circuit courts believed another interpretation 
to be not only “textually permissible” but superior. This reality, of its own force, 
should have been enough of a signal to the majority that it needed to seriously engage 
in the real possibility that its hardline, Black’s Law Dictionary–based interpretation 
may have undermined Congress’s objectives. As in Alyeska Pipeline, the Court’s 
insistence that the statutory language was so clear as to relieve itself from any further 
interpretive obligation certainly weakens the vitality of the remainder of the analysis 
as part of the ratio decidendi.193 
As a normative matter, the Court owes it to the litigants, the public, and even 
Congress to thoroughly think through the costs and benefits of its decisions in all but 
perhaps the clearest of statutory mandates, in which case Congress should bear that 
burden.194 But where, as here, the result is far from preordained, the Court should not 
hide behind the supposed power of a word in a statute. Substantive minimalism’s call 
for deference should not interfere with “the province and duty of the judicial 
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department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must 
of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”195 Perhaps if the Buckhannon Court 
realized that its empirical assumptions—the focus of the remainder of this Part—
might carry precedential weight, it would have more carefully assessed the impact of 
its rule in relation to the statute’s express purpose. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Empirical Assumptions 
At bottom, the majority endorsed a rule that it believed would support settlement. 
It took “a static, ex post approach focused on how the catalyst theory affects incen-
tives once an enforcement action is commenced.”196 The catalyst doctrine, according 
to the Court, had altered Congress’s intended balance and increased costs in two 
ways. First, it necessitated ancillary litigation over whether fees should be shifted 
under the three-part test.197 While professing its faith in the district courts’ ability to 
make this assessment, the Court was displeased with the costs of the catalyst doc-
trine—the doctrine undermined what it termed “ready administrability.”198 The 
Court’s rule, by contrast, was virtually self-executing. Second, defendants who 
wished to voluntarily provide relief would be less likely to do so under the catalyst 
doctrine for fear of additionally paying a fee award. Requiring judicial imprimatur 
eliminated the possibility that voluntarily acquiescing parties could be on the hook 
for attorney’s fees, which, the Court emphasized, can be “even more significant 
than[] their potential liability on the merits.”199 The concurrence added a third cost: 
the increased possibility of false positives, where trial courts would fail to keep fees 
out of the hands of an undeserving plaintiff.200 This risk, according to Justice Scalia, 
was far graver than the (assumed) increased risk of false negatives: 
[I]t seems to me the evil of the [possibility of false positives] far out-
weighs the evil of the [possibility of false negatives]. There is all the 
difference in the world between a rule that denies the extraordinary boon 
of attorney’s fees to some plaintiffs who are no less “deserving” of them 
than others who receive them, and a rule that causes the law to be the 
very instrument of wrong—exacting the payment of attorney’s fees to 
the extortionist.201 
The dissent rejoined first by criticizing the Court’s rule as underinclusive and dis-
couraging plaintiffs with meritorious claims from bringing suit.202 The Court’s rule 
only rewards some litigants who effect congressionally desired change and not 
others: “The decision allows a defendant to escape a statutory obligation to pay a 
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plaintiff’s counsel fees, even though the suit’s merit led the defendant to abandon the 
fray, to switch rather than fight on, to accord plaintiff sooner rather than later the 
principal redress sought in the complaint.”203 Ex ante, the dissent criticized the 
Court’s emphasis on settlement as underappreciating the impact its rule would have 
on the entire system of private enforcement.204 As Professors Albiston and Nielsen 
observe, “[E]ncouraging settlement in the short run will mean little if, over time, 
opportunities for defendants to comply in response to legal challenges decline 
because plaintiffs bring fewer enforcement actions in the first place.”205 Second, the 
dissent criticized the Court for its unwarranted distrust of the district courts’ ability 
to avoid false positives by sifting through meritorious and nonmeritorious claims.206 
Finally, the dissent accused the Court of misapprehending the object of litigation, 
and public interest litigation in particular.207 An aggrieved plaintiff seeking to 
enforce an important legal right cares naught about a judicial signature.208 More 
importantly, the class of persons who would have been subject to the untoward, 
illegal behavior but for a change in the defendant’s activities cares naught about a 
formal judgment.209 The goal—for the litigant and for Congress—is to change 
behavior.210 It is how Buckhannon impacted the ability of plaintiffs to achieve this 
goal to which I now turn. 
1. Cost Assumptions 
Underlying the majority’s assessments of the costs of its rule are at least two em-
pirical assumptions.211 One, identified and tested by Albiston and Nielsen, was the 
Court’s insistence that their standard would not dissuade plaintiffs from bringing 
“meritorious but expensive claims,”212 and thus significantly frustrate Congress’s 
stated intent. Through a national survey of over two hundred public interest organi-
zations, Albiston and Nielsen demonstrate that the Court’s assumption was errone-
ous. Instead, “[o]rganizations that engage in impact litigation, litigate against gov-
ernment actors, bring class actions, and work in the environmental, civil rights, or 
poverty areas were the most likely to report negative effects from this decision.”213 
In a world where repeat players have a serious advantage over one-shot litigators,214 
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Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987))). 
 209. See id. 
 210. See id. 
 211. See generally Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 8. 
 212. Id. at 1087, 1191, 1130. 
 213. Id. at 1120–21. 
 214. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on 
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (discussing the continuum between 
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the Buckhannon decision significantly alters the power balance between public in-
terest plaintiffs and defendants by discouraging and impeding lawyers from pursuing 
enforcement actions.215 
A second key assumption, also identified by Albiston and Nielsen, was the 
Court’s claim that strategic capitulation would not be a problem. “Strategic capitula-
tion” occurs when “defendants faced with likely adverse judgments attempt to moot 
the case and to defeat the plaintiff’s fee petition by providing the requested relief 
before judgment.”216 The catalyst doctrine ensured that defendants could not unilat-
erally moot claims by providing relief only to the particular plaintiff without also 
compensating the plaintiff’s attorneys for bringing the claim.217 
The Court, in response to these concerns, argued first that the voluntary cessation 
exception to mootness would provide sufficient protection for plaintiffs from in-
sincere changes in behavior.218 However, as Albiston and Nielsen observe: 
Even a last-minute sincere change in conduct, however, may still elimi-
nate fee awards for plaintiffs who bring meritorious claims that would 
have succeeded if the case had gone to trial, giving these defendants one 
free bite at the apple without liability for fees, so long as they mend their 
ways before judgment.219 
And there is a further problem as well: government defendants (especially, but not 
exclusively, when acting legislatively) are frequently granted special solicitude in 
the voluntary cessation analysis.220 Finally, some suits are simply not amenable to 
                                                                                                                 
 
“one-shotters” and “repeat players”).  
 215. Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 8, at 1121. For a closer look at how Buckhannon has 
impacted certain types of plaintiffs, see, for example, Stefan R. Hanson, Buckhannon, Special 
Education Disputes, and Attorneys’ Fees: Time for a Congressional Response Again, 2003 
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 519, 543–49; Paul D. Reingold, Requiem for Section 1983, 3 DUKE J. 
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 31–33 (2008); Lucia A. Silecchia, The Catalyst Calamity: Post-
Buckhannon Fee-Shifting in Environmental Litigation and a Proposal for Congressional Ac-
tion, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 40–59 (2004); Brian J. Sutherland, Voting Rights Rollback: 
The Effect of Buckhannon on the Private Enforcement of Voting Rights, 30 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 
267, 276–87 (2008). Also, see Annabelle Chan, Comment, The Buckhannon Stops Here: 
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human 
Resources Should Not Apply to the New York Equal Access to Justice Act, 72 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1341, 1359–62, 1365–69 (2004). Further research should evaluate how public interest 
litigants and organizations have adapted their strategies to deal with Buckhannon. 
 216. Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 8, at 1091. 
 217. See id. 
 218. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 609 (2001) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 
528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)). The voluntary cessation doctrine holds that a defendant’s voluntary 
conduct may not moot a case unless the defendant demonstrates “that it is absolutely clear the 
allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, 
528 U.S. at 190. 
 219. Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 8, at 1102. 
 220. Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 8, at 1112 & n.140 (collecting cases); see, e.g., Steven 
B. Dow, Navigating Through the Problem of Mootness in Corrections Litigation, 43 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 651, 675 & n.238–46 (2015) (same); Michael Ashton, Note, Recovering Attorneys’ 
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mootness doctrine exceptions. For example, a Freedom of Information Act221 suit is 
mooted once the requested information is provided because relief and recurrence are 
mutually exclusive.222 
Second, the Court noted that strategic capitulation would only threaten plaintiffs 
seeking solely equitable relief; “so long as the plaintiff has a cause of action for dam-
ages, a defendant’s change in conduct will not moot the case.”223 While this is cer-
tainly accurate, damages are frequently unavailable in private attorney general suits 
against state actors, especially given the recent expansion of sovereign immunity.224 
Strategic capitulation, Albiston and Nielsen conclude, certainly occurs and dis-
proportionately so among public interest litigants. 
The Supreme Court missed the mark on both of its empirical assumptions under-
lying its estimated costs; requiring judicial imprimatur does in fact exact many costs 
on one side of the ledger. Buckhannon has chilled public interest litigation “across 
the political spectrum,” and defendants have had success unilaterally mooting law-
suits to avoid paying fees (and, in some instances, to avoid providing meaningful 
relief).225 
2. Benefit Assumptions 
Perhaps all of Buckhannon’s increased costs would nonetheless be justified if the 
anticipated benefit is sufficient. After all, we tolerate costs, even high costs, in many 
policy areas in exchange for some benefits.226 The Court targeted one major bene-
fit—lower taxpayer cost—albeit in more words that were obscured by citations to its 
earlier decisions to support extraordinarily broad propositions.227 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court gleaned from these earlier decisions a quasi-canon of construction, 
                                                                                                                 
 
Fees with the Voluntary Cessation Exception to Mootness Doctrine After Buckhannon Board 
and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 2002 WIS. 
L. REV. 965, 969 (“[T]he voluntary cessation exception most likely will not be applied to gov-
ernment defendants . . . .”). 
 221. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327). 
 222. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 8, at 1106. 
 223. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608–09. 
 224. Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 8, at 1102. 
 225. Id. at 1132.  
To us, Buckhannon’s broad effects across the political spectrum of rights litiga-
tion indicate that the consequences of this decision extend beyond the political 
struggles between left and right. Buckhannon and the larger attack on rights en-
forcement also may signal an ominous shift of power away from private enforce-
ment of rights toward government power both to resist civil rights mandates and 
to control the enforcement of these rights. 
Id. at 1132–33. 
 226. Cf., e.g., A. L. Berthelsen, Can Cost-Overruns Be Controlled?, U.S.A.F. JAG L. REV., 
Mar.–Apr. 1966, at 43, 44 (1966) (“[O]verexpenditure, followed by demand for reimburse-
ment, has come to be a significant problem in the administration of the [government] cost 
contract.”). 
 227. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 609–10 (expressing worries over “ready administrabil-
ity” and duplicitous litigation); cf. Collier, supra note 139, at 800 (“[T]he ‘traditional’ concep-
tion [of precedential authority] is that an excessively broad principle . . . is dictum.”). 
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whereby it “avoid[s] an interpretation of the fee-shifting statutes that would have 
‘spawn[ed] a second litigation of significant dimension,’” viz, increased cost.228 The 
Court’s concern over “ready administrability,”229 too, is not an abstract concern over 
the capacity of the district courts, but instead reflects a judgment that any increase in 
“justice” that might result from a different standard is not worth the increased cost.230 
The underlying assumption, then, is that the Court’s rule would effect this benefit of 
decreased costs. 
As Albiston and Nielsen allude to, however, this assumption is far from certain. 
Albiston and Nielsen briefly mention three consequences of Buckhannon that tend to 
undermine any efficiency benefits that its rule may claim. First, the Supreme Court’s 
observation that the voluntary cessation exception may be available to ensure that a 
defendant may not unilaterally defeat fee shifting cuts both ways, as the exception 
frequently requires ancillary proceedings and inquiries into the defendant’s mo-
tives.231 To the extent that the voluntary cessation exception mitigates any of the 
damage done by the judicial imprimatur standard, it is far from obvious that it is any 
more efficient. 
Second, strategic capitulation actually draws out litigation that should otherwise 
settle quickly.232 Again, Albiston and Nielsen explain how this is so: “[W]hen com-
pliance costs are significant, defendants have an incentive to delay until recovery is 
certain (to save the costs of compliance in the short term) and then change their po-
sition at the last minute to avoid both an adverse judgment and a large fee award.”233 
It is at least possible, and perhaps greatly possible, for a defendant to unilaterally 
terminate litigation by capitulating and thereby defeat a motion for attorney’s fees. 
Furthermore, because the defendant alone knows how or when the defendant might 
capitulate, the defendant may do so at the most convenient possible moment. And 
they may do so while a plaintiff continues to tarry and expend both her own resources 
and the court’s resources, unsuspecting of the defendant’s ultimate plan.  
This possibility is far from theoretical. In Buckhannon itself, an assisted-living 
home and a resident challenged a state law requiring residents to be capable of “self-
preservation”234 (that is, be able on their own to reach fire exits) under the Fair 
Housing Amendments Act235 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.236 As the 
plaintiffs were preparing to proceed to trial, the state legislature eliminated the “self-
preservation” provision, mooting the case.237 But, all the while, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 228. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 609 (second alteration in original) (quoting Tex. State 
Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791 (1989)). 
 229. Id. at 610 (quoting City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 566 (1992)). 
 230. Cf. Morrison, supra note 39. 
 231. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 8, at 1102 n.78; Ashton, supra note 220, at 968. 
 232. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 8, at 1130. 
 233. Id. at 1101. 
 234. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600–01. 
 235. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3601–19 (2000)). 
 236. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101–213 (2000)). 
 237. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601. 
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the plaintiffs expend[ed] further resources unaware that the defendants 
intend[ed] to capitulate. Indeed, citing [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 
11, the Buckhannon plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to recover $62,459 of 
litigation expenses they incurred after defendants became aware, but did 
not disclose, that the legislature was likely to repeal the challenged rule.238 
In many other situations and cases, too, judges and scholars have recognized that 
Buckhannon actually discourages early settlement and protracts litigation.239  
But while scholars and courts have latched upon the impact for plaintiffs,240 the 
greater burden upon the judicial system and taxpayer has been insufficiently empha-
sized and examined. The Buckhannon Court expressed particular concern with the 
expense of the catalyst doctrine. But extended litigation, replete with additional ex-
penditures for courts and defense attorneys (frequently government attorneys, in 
many public interest cases), snowballs quickly.241 As with the prospect of increased 
satellite litigation for voluntary cessation issues, the substantial expense of protracted 
litigation threatens to entirely undermine whatever efficiency benefits Buckhannon 
targeted. Furthermore, the Buckhannon majority could not pretend to be unaware of 
this possibility, as Justice Ginsburg emphasized this issue in her dissent.242 
Finally, there are the less easily measured—but still very real—pecuniary costs 
of hamstrung private enforcement mechanisms.243 Public enforcement is extremely 
costly, which is a large part of why Congress has expanded fee-shifting provisions 
to encourage and enable private enforcement.244 For example, substantial public ex-
pense might be saved where litigation curtails the funding of illegal activity. These 
costs are in addition to immeasurable social costs caused by the illegal activity itself. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 238. Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 8, at 1101–02 (emphasis added). 
 239. See sources cited supra note 215. 
 240. See, e.g., Bingham v. New Berlin Sch. Dist., 550 F.3d 601, 604 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(Rovner, J.) (observing, in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act context, that “[a] 
school district can delay providing expensive educational services as long as possible and hope 
that the parents either tire of the battle, rematriculate elsewhere, or that the child ages out of 
the school system. By doing so they do not risk having to pay the opposing side's attorneys’ 
fees at the end of the protracted battle, provided they capitulate sometime prior to judgment”); 
see also sources cited supra note 215. 
 241. See, e.g., LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GRP. & U.S. CHAMBER 
INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES 2 (2010), 
www.uscourts.gov/file/document/litigation-cost-survey-major-companies (“The reality is that 
the high transaction costs of litigation . . . threaten to exceed the amount at issue in all but the 
largest cases.”); Landyn Wm. Rookard, Note, A Referee Without a Whistle: Magistrate Judges 
and Discovery Sanctions in the Seventh Circuit, 91 IND. L.J. 569, 569 nn.5–8 (2016) (collect-
ing authorities). 
 242. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Might not one conclude 
overall . . . that the catalyst rule ‘saves judicial resources’ by encouraging ‘plaintiffs to dis-
continue litigation after receiving through the defendant’s acquiescence the remedy initially 
sought?’” (citations omitted) (first quoting Paris v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 988 
F.2d 236, 240 (1st Cir. 1993); then quoting Morris v. City of West Palm Beach, 194 F.3d 1203, 
1207 (11th Cir. 1999))). 
 243. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 8, at 1089–91. 
 244. See S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 4 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5911 
(“[F]ee shifting provisions have been successful in enabling vigorous enforcement of modern 
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Albiston and Nielsen’s research establishes that Buckhannon had far greater costs 
than the majority anticipated. Their research also suggests that Buckhannon’s hold-
ing did not realize the majority’s sought-after taxpayer savings. This is a case where 
the Court’s interpretation “obstruct[ed] the document’s purpose” rather than further-
ing it.245 The damage done was ill confined, however, as the lower courts have treated 
these assumptions as precedential to expand Buckhannon. 
C. Procedural Maximalism: Erroneous Assumptions Become Factual Precedent 
Buckhannon’s unsupported empirical assumptions, which may be well character-
ized as facts found by “mere judicial intuition,”246 have had far-reaching implications 
for other cases. This stems from the uncertain precedential value of appellate court–
found legislative facts.247 
A legislative fact “provides descriptive information about the world that judges 
use as foundational building blocks to form and apply legal rules” and is exempt 
from judicial notice procedural requirements.248 Such facts “may not be the product 
of careful deliberation,”249 according to Professor Allison Larsen, for several reasons. 
First, often neither the fact’s accuracy nor its usage to support a proposition is subject 
to the adversarial process. Leaving aside the high frequency with which facts are 
found without citation, Larsen found that, of the 120 most salient Supreme Court 
decisions handed down between 2000 and 2010, over half contained at least one ci-
tation to an authority not contained in any of the party or amicus briefs.250 That is, 
the Court selected the authority entirely of its own accord without the opportunity 
                                                                                                                 
 
civil rights legislation, while at the same time limiting the growth of the enforcement bureau-
cracy.”); Burbank et al., supra note 12, at 645–46 (“Privately-initiated litigation satisfies the 
impulse in favor of decentralized regulation, and even though the federal and state govern-
ments substantially subsidize civil courts, the system is likely cheaper for the state, and hence 
for the taxpayers . . . than exclusive reliance on centralized (state-initiated) enforcement would 
be.”); see also Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 8, at 1089–91.   
 245. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 192, at 63. 
 246. Sandra F. Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Fakers and Floodgates, 10 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. 
& CIV. LIBERTIES 223, 249 (2014). 
 247. See, e.g., Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622, 635–44 (7th Cir. 2015) (Hamilton, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (highlighting many of the problems with judicial 
factual research in general and appellate research in particular); Larsen, Confronting Supreme 
Court Fact Finding, supra note 36, at 1274; Larsen, Factual Precedents, supra note 36, at 71; 
Richard A. Posner, What Is Obviously Wrong with the Federal Judiciary, Yet Eminently Cur-
able (pt. 1), 19 GREEN BAG 2D 187, 188 (2016) (“Criticisms of my opinions tend to focus on 
my citing Internet websites in them.”); Frederick Schauer, The Decline of “The Record”: A 
Comment on Posner, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 51 (2013); Sperino & Thomas, supra note 246, at 249 
(“The treatment of the courts of these cases is even more remarkable because these cases are 
some of the most factually intensive in the courts, making them the least appropriate for judges 
to decide.”); Robert Iafolla, In High Stakes Friedrichs Case, U.S. Supreme Court Has No Rec-
ord To Review, REUTERS LEGAL, Jan. 8, 2016, 1/8/16 REUTERS LEGAL 11:00:01. 
 248. Larsen, Factual Precedents, supra note 36, at 71. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, supra note 36, at 1274. 
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for the scrupulous or skeptical to respond. Second, justices marshal facts “to build 
arguments and to tell a ‘story.’”251 This means that  
factual authorities are selected for a reason distinct from how likely they 
are to be accurate. As one judge candidly explained, a judge “picks her 
rhetoric to foreshadow the result.” . . . “Motivated reasoning” and “con-
firmation bias” are terms psychologists use to describe this phenome-
non—we look for sources to support what we already think we know.252  
As a result, factual claims may be biased or “plainly incorrect.”253 
The problem, of course, goes beyond the one erroneous legislative fact that may 
support (in whole or in part) an appellate court decision. Rather, it is compounded 
by the fact’s precedential value—especially when the deciding court is the Supreme 
Court. While the jurisprudential and theoretical precedential weight of legislative 
facts is far from clear,254 there is mounting evidence that lower courts and the 
Supreme Court are treating such facts as actually preclusive. In a growing list of 
cases, the factual findings have gained precedential life and their results may not be 
distinguished by presentation of evidence of factual falsity. 255 
The Court’s factual assumption in Buckhannon that its rule would produce greater 
administrability and decreased costs but would not chill public interest claims has 
seeped into the lower courts’ jurisprudence and become precedential. The Third 
Circuit held that Buckhannon allowed fee shifting only upon a consent decree or 
“enforceable judgment on the merits” and, applying that holding, determined that a 
temporary restraining order did not meet that standard.256 Buckhannon referred to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 251. Larsen, Factual Precedents, supra note 36, at 101. 
 252. Id. (quoting Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: 
Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1377 (1995)) (citing Stuart Ford, A Social Psy-
chology Model of the Perceived Legitimacy of International Criminal Courts: Implications for 
the Success of Transitional Justice Mechanisms, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 405, 420–21, 434 
(2012)). This seems to be especially possible where, as here, the Court firmly rests its holding 
on a minimalistic deference to a particular reading of a particular word, resulting in even less 
scrutiny of the Court’s factual observations. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 256–68. 
 253. Larsen, Factual Precedents, supra note 36, at 101. 
 254. See sources cited supra note 247. 
 255. Larsen cites two examples: the claim in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), 
(which invalidated corporate campaign expenditure limits) that corporate independent expend-
itures do not corrupt politics, and the claim in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003), 
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improve a law school education. Larsen, Factual Precedents, supra note 36, at 94–96. Both 
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Court’s finding. In a Montana case, the state supreme court distinguished Citizens United on 
its own factual record about expenditures and corruption. Id. at 95–96 (citing W. Tradition 
P’ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Am. Tradition P’ship, 
Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per curiam)). The Supreme Court promptly and curtly 
reversed. Am. Tradition P’ship, 132 S. Ct. 2490. In a Fifth Circuit case, the court refused to 
consider the substantial record against the Court’s Grutter finding about the benefits of racial 
diversity. Larsen, Factual Precedents, supra note 36, at 96–97 (citing Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. 
at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013)). 
 256. Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 650 F.3d 223, 232 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
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judgments on the merits and consent decrees as “examples”—not as the ultimate 
limitation on “judicial imprimatur,”257 as the dissent vehemently pointed out: “The 
Majority’s insistence on a ‘judgment,’ rather than Buckhannon’s broader ‘judicial 
imprimatur,’ will only unnecessarily drag out cases and lead to judicial inefficiency. 
The essential question in the prevailing party inquiry is whether the party has ob-
tained a judicial alteration of the legal relationship between the parties.”258 The Third 
Circuit noted that the Supreme Court considered the “policy argument . . . that with-
out the catalyst theory ‘defendants [could] unilaterally moot[] an action before judg-
ment in an effort to avoid an award of attorney’s fees’—but was not swayed. Thus, 
however persuasive that argument may seem, it cannot influence our decision 
here.”259 The Third Circuit refused to countenance a challenge to the Supreme 
Court’s factual assumption, even as its holding arguably extended the scope of 
Buckhannon.260 
The Sixth Circuit recently considered the impact of Buckhannon on the ability to 
recover attorney’s fees for “time spent defending or enforcing a prior consent de-
cree”261 and explicitly addressed the weight due to Supreme Court’s assumptions: 
[W]e are hesitant to conclude . . . that Buckhannon has no import in the 
post-decree context. In fact, the rationale underlying Buckhannon’s lim-
itations in the pre-decree or pre-judgment context—avoiding fact-
intensive and time-consuming satellite litigation—suggests that we 
should also accord it some weight in the post-decree context. The real 
question is how much work it should do given these contextual differ-
ences, i.e., before there has been any judicially-sanctioned material alter-
ation of the parties’ legal relationship or after such an alteration.262 
The Sixth Circuit reached a middle ground between no fee shifting and fee shifting 
only upon a material change in legal relationship, holding that the action to enforce 
the decree must be necessary and result (as in Buckhannon) in a judicial determina-
tion that secures successful enforcement.263 
And the general assumption upon which the Buckhannon Court’s policy argument 
rests (viz. that making plaintiffs’ suits more difficult will deter “extortionists” and 
result in greater efficiency264) is appearing in other areas of law. In University of 
Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,265 for example, the Supreme Court 
held that Title VII retaliation claims can only be proved by but-for causation and not 
by a motivating factor analysis. In so doing, the Court assumed (without any 
                                                                                                                 
 
 257. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 604–05 (2001) (“We think, however, the ‘catalyst theory’ falls on the other side of 
the line from these examples.”). 
 258. Singer Mgmt. Consultants, 650 F.3d at 239–40 (Roth, J., dissenting). 
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empirical evidence) that the higher causation standard would be necessary to remedy 
a “fakers and floodgates problem,” whereby too many plaintiffs without credible 
claims were assumedly rushing for the opportunity to make a quick buck.266 Lower 
courts are already drawing upon the Court’s assumptions to justify their decisions267 
and the assumptions are becoming “part of the running, default narrative about 
retaliation.”268 
An appellate judge may find facts in three ways: the judge may send a case to the 
trial court to receive evidence on the issue, the judge may engage in independent 
“extra-record research,” or the judge may “simply assert an emphatic view of the fact 
with nothing to support the view except for ‘common experience.’”269 In 
Buckhannon, the Court took route three, and erroneously so. That erroneous fact is 
now generating extensive precedent in the lower courts and binding distinct non-
parties. But an even greater concern for public interest litigants is that this factual 
precedent could serve to further undermine the vitality of fee-shifting statutes, espe-
cially with the Supreme Court’s quasi-canon of construction whereby it “avoid[s] an 
interpretation of the fee-shifting statutes that would have ‘spawn[ed] a second litiga-
tion of significant dimension’”270—meaning, an increase in cost. Congress’s inten-
tional scheme of private attorney general enforcement could be in serious jeopardy 
without renewed and specific remedial action. 
CONCLUSION 
The American Rule has always been subject to exceptions. Acting in equity, the 
Supreme Court itself jumped aboard and shepherded development of the common 
fund and substantial benefit exceptions. These exceptions were carefully crafted to 
weigh litigation incentives, consider their impact on nonparties, and provide guid-
ance to district judges who were expected to exercise discretion in performing their 
historic equitable responsibility to do justice in the particular case. The lower courts, 
competent at and comfortable with performing this type of inquiry, interpreted their 
statutory mandate to award fees to “prevailing parties” in much the same way through 
the catalyst doctrine. 
Under the guise of deference, the Court has shirked its responsibility to interpret 
the law in a coherent and reasonable manner. Particularly in Buckhannon, the Court’s 
broadly applicable empirical assumptions have caused lower courts to hold that 
litigants may not marshal evidence of the decision’s empirical shortcomings to limit 
                                                                                                                 
 
 266. Sperino & Thomas, supra note 246, at 224, 235–36. As in Buckhannon, these assump-
tions are likely ill-founded. See id. at 237–41. 
 267. E.g., id. at 225 (citing Chase v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 12-11182-DPW, 2013 WL 
5948373, at *11 (D. Mass. Nov. 4, 2013); Childs-Bey v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., No. 
TJS-10-2835, 2013 WL 5718747, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 2013), aff’d, 564 Fed. App’x 13 (4th 
Cir. 2014); Foster v. Univ. of Md. E. Shore, No. TJS-10-1933, 2013 WL 5487813, at *2 (D. 
Md. Sept. 27, 2013), rev’d, 787 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2015)). 
 268. Id. at 249. 
 269. Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, supra note 36, at 1260. 
 270. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 609 (2001) (second alteration in original) (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. 
Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791 (1989)). 
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the decision to its factual context. This is part of a disturbing trend of appellate-found 
facts that are not subject to adversarial scrutiny. It is extremely hard not to sympa-
thize with the district courts and courts of appeals in this situation—after all, the 
Supreme Court itself has a track record of treating its factual findings as preceden-
tial.271 Clearly, it is the responsibility of the fact-finding (or fact-assuming) appellate 
court to make the grounds for, and extent of, its holdings explicitly clear. Generally 
speaking, Congress has the power to enact a statute that is internally inconsistent or 
contrary to public policy.272 If the Court truly believes that a statute’s language is so 
clear as to override the presumption that Congress writes sensible statutes (and even 
if the majority believes that the particular interpretation would effectuate that sensi-
ble purpose), the Court should say so in clear terms.273 After saying so, there is noth-
ing wrong with then making observations to dispel any concerns that one may have 
about the implications of the rule. But in making a decision’s language-based ratio 
decidendi unmistakable, the Court would enable the lower courts to distinguish the 
Court’s holdings on factual grounds and prevent a decision from obtaining un-
warranted breadth on the basis of untested factual findings. 
While the Court’s fact finding may well have serious ramifications for public in-
terest litigation, Congress remains available to correct the Court’s errors. Already, it 
has begun to do so.274 But in pursuit of perfect deference to Congress, the Court in 
Alyeska Pipeline and Buckhannon has twice forced Congress to expend time, energy, 
and taxpayer money remedying the Court’s mistakes. The Supreme Court would 
have done well to recognize that the courts have long been endowed with the equita-
ble power to do justice in the particular case and that Congress depends upon the 
courts to operationalize its statutory frameworks. When Congress is displeased with 
the leeway the courts have at equity, Congress may of course restrict that leeway. 
Particularly in the application of the American Rule, an operating presumption that 
courts have equitable powers to begin with would have been far more in keeping 
with the Rule’s storied history. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 271. See supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
 272. See, e.g., James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1972) (“Our task, however, is not 
to weigh this statute’s effectiveness but its constitutionality. Whether the returns under the 
statute justify the expense, time, and efforts of state officials is for the ongoing supervision of 
the legislative branch.”). 
 273. This may seem contradictory, as I have already argued that the Court clearly rested 
its holding in Buckhannon on the weight of the term “prevailing party.” See Part IV.A; see 
also Buckhannon 532 U.S. at 610 (“Given the clear meaning of ‘prevailing party’ in the fee-
shifting statutes, we need not determine which way these various policy arguments cut.”). 
However, here I am arguing for doctrinal development whereby the Court exercises restraint 
in how it interprets its own cases wholly dependent upon a language-based interpretation. Cf. 
Larsen, Factual Precedents, supra note 36, at 113–14 (“[A]bsent a clear statement from the 
Supreme Court announcing a rule informed by a factual generalization, a lower court should 
assume it is not bound by the Court’s factual statement. . . . My clear statement rule would 
provide an incentive for the Supreme Court to be precise on the role facts play in its 
decisions.”). 
 274. E.g., OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 4, 121 Stat. 2524, 2525 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii) (2012)) (amending FOIA’s fee-shifting 
provision to provide that a party may prevail upon a “voluntary or unilateral change in position 
by the agency, if the complainan’'s claim is not insubstantial”). 
